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taly’s referendum on the constitutional reform, to take place on Sunday, December 
4th, is politically highly charged, and its outcome could become a manifest 
expression of euro-scepticism in one of largest economies of the euro area.  
A prevalent line of reasoning1 argues that the Italians are understandably dissatisfied 
with falling living standards and high unemployment, for which the euro is held 
responsible in both cases. This argument continues by insisting that Italy’s economy 
would have performed much better if it had been allowed to devalue its currency and 
if it were not bound by German-imposed austerity. According to this view, Germany 
is ultimately responsible for Italy’s problems.  
Until a few years ago, it was argued that Germany was impeding the recovery of the 
euro area periphery by opposing a more expansionary monetary policy and not 
allowing the ECB to undertake large-scale government bond purchases. This 
argument proved to have weak foundations when the ECB decided to engage in the 
purchase of sovereign bonds, but it did not result in higher growth rates across the 
union. 
Today the problem is no longer monetary policy but rather fiscal policy and the 
‘austerity’ imposed by Germany. The argument is twofold. First, it is argued that 
Germany does not allow the European Commission to bend the euro-area’s fiscal rules 
and allow Italy to run larger deficit. However, this statement overlooks the reality that 
it is the Commission, and not Berlin, that takes all the relevant decisions under the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, it neglects the fact that fiscal policy has recently 
                                                   
1 See for instance FT, 20 November 2016  
(https://www.ft.com/content/7ea6837a-ad83-11e6-ba7d-76378e4fef24). 
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become expansionary in Italy, as the government has tried to buy popularity by 
initiating ad hoc transfers and selective tax reductions.   
Second, another often-heard argument is that the large current account surplus of 
Germany could benefit other euro-area countries, if this could lead in higher 
expenditure in Germany. It is undoubtedly true that its neighbours could increase 
their exports if demand in Germany were to increase, but the real question is how to 
induce German consumers to spend more and German enterprises to invest more in 
Germany. The German government does not have many levers at its disposal.  
In fact, consumption is already increasing at a healthy rate, propelled by record-low 
unemployment and solid wage increases. This has had a small impact on the trade 
balance surplus, which has fallen slightly, but no impact on the current account 
surplus, given that the increase in the income on German assets abroad has offset the 
fall in the trade balance. The introduction of a minimum wage last year apparently has 
also not had a noticeable impact on this pattern. 
This leaves fiscal policy as the main lever by which the German government could 
stimulate the economy. A priori, one would expect that a fiscal expansion in Germany, 
possibly through an infrastructure investment programme, should have a strong 
external impact because the German economy is operating at close to full capacity. 
Under these conditions, any additional demand should thus result in higher imports. 
Moreover, in the current situation of negative output gaps in most member states and 
monetary policy operating at the zero bound, such a positive shock could be associated 
with significant positive spillover effects into other countries. According to the 
European Commission’s simulations,2 a two-year increase in government investment 
in Germany and in other core euro-area countries of 1% of GDP leads to an increase in 
GDP between 0.2 and 0.3% in Italy (and other peripheral countries) driven by trade 
linkages. While positive, this is a rather limited effect. 
A recent CEPS study (Belke and Osowski, 2016)3 finds somewhat larger spillover 
effects, but these are much smaller than in other countries. In particular, the results 
suggest that an expansionary fiscal policy in Germany mainly benefits its immediate 
neighbours, i.e. Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark, all of which are 
already doing well and running also large current-account surpluses.  
It is thus misleading to believe that Italy’s problems could be solved in Berlin.  
                                                   
2 See J. in ‘t Veld (2013), “Fiscal consolidations and spillovers in the euro area periphery and core”, 
European Economic Paper, No. 506, European Commission, October. 
3 See A. Belke and T. Osowski (2016), ”Measuring fiscal spillovers in EMU and beyond: A global VAR 
approach”, forthcoming CEPS Working Document, CEPS, Brussels.  
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The key source of concern in Italy is public debt, which is now close to 140% of GDP 
and which has attracted the attention of financial markets and much political 
commentary. The main cause of such a dangerously high ratio of public debt is the low 
GDP growth of Italy. The country has underperformed vis-á-vis the rest of the euro 
area for three decades now. This underperformance started long before the 
introduction of the euro. Even during the 1990s, when the lira depreciated strongly, 
Italy’s growth rate was about half a percentage point lower than that of the euro area 
(1.7% versus 2.2%). During the decade of the 2000s, the degree of underperformance 
even increased (the growth differential with respect to the euro area increased to 0.8 
%) implying that Italy’s growth had been disappointing long before ‘austerity’ (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Real GDP growth rates, euro-area average and Italy (year moving average) 
 
Source: Own calculations on European Commission data (AMECO). 
 
In short, the euro, and its ‘Teutonic’ rules, might provide a convenient scapegoat to 
politicians, but in reality the fate of the country is ultimately in its own hands. 
